Redak­tion „novinki“

Hum­boldt-Uni­ver­sität zu Berlin
Sprach- und lite­ra­tur­wis­sen­schaft­liche Fakultät
Institut für Slawistik
Unter den Linden 6
10099 Berlin

Speechl­ess­ness: Con­ver­sa­tion with Pavel Arsenev about rus­sian anti-war poetry

Over about 17 years since its crea­tion in Saint Peters­burg, the inde­pen­dent journal for poetry and theory [Translit] has been publi­shing poli­ti­cally engaged poetry and lite­rary cri­ti­cism in rus­sian lan­guage. The full-scale inva­sion of Ukraine by Russia’s armed forces on February 24 marked a signi­fi­cant break in the history of the journal, brin­ging their lef­tist agenda and a post­co­lo­nial, anti-impe­rial approach to wri­ting to a new point of crisis. Former col­le­agues and fri­ends both in Ukraine and Russia became apart because of dif­fe­rent opi­nions about the future per­spec­tives of publi­shing, as well as about the task of poetry and poets in times of war.


For fur­ther rea­ding, the issue #25 of [Translit] can be found online here.


By devo­ting their newest issue #25 to the pro­blem of the absence of words, or speechl­ess­ness (bol’she net slov), the edi­to­rial board of [Translit] aimed at addres­sing what has become the centre of cul­tural debates that are con­ti­nuing on social media after the newly intro­duced cen­sor­ship laws. Namely, that the inva­sion of Ukraine has hit the core of rus­sian iden­tity and cul­ture, making it impos­sible to look at its heri­tage, as well as speak and write poetry in this lan­guage, in the same way it has been done before. The title is hence reflec­ting not only the uncanny silence of the public and absence of any signi­fi­cant demons­tra­tions against the war – at least as seen in com­pa­rison with anti-puti­nist ral­lies in February 2021, – but fur­ther­most is addres­sing the lack of words with which the poli­tical oppo­si­tion can posi­tion itself in the frame­work of this cul­tural and poli­tical catastrophe.


The pre­sen­ta­tion and dis­cus­sion of the issue #25 of [Translit] took place at the Hum­boldt-Uni­ver­sität zu Berlin, on July 6, in the pre­sence of the chief editor Pavel Arsenev, and was mode­rated by Natalia Gri­nina, staff member of the insti­tute of Slavic and Hun­ga­rian Studies.


Natalia Gri­nina: Pavel, due to the con­ti­nua­tion of the War in Ukraine, we wit­ness a lot of pres­sure put on rus­sian spea­king artists and wri­ters coming from the side of Ukrai­nian cul­tural workers both for spea­king and not spea­king out against it. In the exis­ting frame­work of war, neither words nor silence seem to be appro­priate: any speech that can be marked or regarded as ‘rus­sian’ appears to have lost its cre­di­bi­lity because it could not be proven to help pre­ven­ting fur­ther vio­lence from explo­ding.[1] Still, the edi­to­rial board of [Translit] decided not to remain silent but addressed the pro­blem of speechl­ess­ness, resul­ting both from the pro­hi­bi­tion of free speech due to war cen­sor­ship and as a reac­tion to a shock at the loss of the mea­ning of lan­guage, since the ‘war’ may no longer be called ‘war’, and people who go on the streets with the word ‘peace’ written on blank sheets of paper are called ‚fascists’…


How did you come up with this idea and what strug­gles has the edi­to­rial board faced while working on it?


Pavel Arsenev: After the initial (emo­tional) response to the war and the ques­tion of how we could pos­sibly help our fellow wri­ters and col­le­agues from Ukraine, mea­ning, above all, finan­cial aid, we had to ask our­selves whe­ther we could re-navi­gate in a new frame­work of war or just stop publi­shing and close. We unders­tood that we find our­selves in a spe­cific his­to­rical moment: While we were expe­ri­en­cing ‘only’ an unpre­ce­dented cul­tural cata­strophe, others were trying to save their lives. One of the main points for our theo­re­tical reflec­tions was hence to under­stand and ques­tion the journal as a spe­cific cul­tural form (or as a foundation/mediation) or ‘agent’ of speech during the time of war.


Remem­be­ring the (in)famous quote by Adorno sta­ting that any poem written after Ausch­witz must be an act of bar­ba­rism, we were unavo­id­ably facing the same his­to­rical pro­blem our­selves: Any form of wri­ting or publi­shing poetry in rus­sian lan­guage could be easily con­sidered ‘bar­baric’ or inap­pro­priate, as well as any form of ‘cul­tural work’ (even though it would posi­tion itself in an anti-war con­text) could be suspected of ‘col­la­bo­ra­tion’ with the same agents of poli­tical power who are now bom­bing Ukrai­nian cities. Alt­hough we have never been pro­vi­ders or sup­porters of rus­sian impe­ria­lism (as you can cle­arly see from our history and con­tent of the maga­zine), our con­ti­nuing of ‚cul­tural work’ would mean that we are still posi­tio­ning our­selves in the frame­work of ‘Great Rus­sian Cul­ture’ that has in some way pro­vided the foun­da­tion for this vio­lent mili­tary act.


Hence, we made it our common task, as a cul­tural micro-insti­tu­tion, to per­form an act of ‘burial’ to the excep­tio­na­list idea of rus­sian history and cul­ture, in order to con­demn it in the stric­test way pos­sible. We were also drawn to re-nego­tiate our belon­ging to a spe­cific cul­tural tra­di­tion in which our journal has been stan­ding quite unwil­lingly: the so-called ‘thick lite­rary journal’ that goes back to the 19th cen­tury and that has a back­ground of ‘poli­tical acti­vism’ in its agenda since the foun­da­tion of Sov­re­mennik (1836–1866). This tra­di­tion, that strived towards more poli­tical freedom, civic society and liberal reforms, sur­vived until the very end of the Pere­stroika Era thanks to the lite­rary-poli­tical maga­zine Novy Mir and lead to the rise of a com­ple­tely new line of cri­tical aca­demic jour­nals in post-soviet Russia (Novoe Lite­ra­turnoe Oboz­renie, Nepri­kos­no­vennyi Zapas and others). Unfort­u­na­tely, seeing the twi­light of demo­cratic deve­lo­p­ments in our country led us to the painful ack­now­led­ge­ment that this cul­tural tra­di­tion, with its his­to­rical heri­tage, could not bring the desi­rable results.


This is why we have shifted our atten­tion to the poli­tical aspect of civil pro­test and dis­o­be­dience: If we still had the right to con­tinue to publish at all, we had to pre­vent our­selves from main­tai­ning the illu­sion of ‘busi­ness as usual’ and to make our anti-war agenda cle­arly and unmist­akably dis­cer­nible from the journal’s content.


N.G.: After having done a few pre­sen­ta­tions of the new issue inside russia, [Translit] had to face cri­ti­cism from former col­le­agues and fri­ends. Publicly spea­king out against the war is regarded by some people as both pro­vo­ca­tive and ‘unneces­sary’, because it only end­an­gers people who have been working on it but does not ‘change any­thing’. What makes you dis­agree with this claim?


P.A.: With the power that we still had at our dis­posal, we tried to address this very divi­sion, which assumes that there is an either-or kind of choice bet­ween ‘com­plete silence’ in Russia and a ‘safe space for expres­sion’ in the so-called liberal West, where any such expres­sion ‘against the war’ is also com­ple­tely useless.


Already back in 2014, the annexa­tion of Crimea and the Donbas war created a split in the oppo­si­tion groups. Ins­tead of uni­fied oppo­si­tion two camps emerged – those who were for “our Crimea” and those who were against. But it was still pos­sible to cri­ti­cize natio­na­list and impe­ria­list posi­tions of those were for ‘our Crimea’ and phy­si­cally co-exist with them.


In 2022 this split has rea­ched an exis­ten­tial cha­racter. The new cen­sor­ship law sug­gests that any form of cri­ti­cism is not legal and hence impos­sible. So that if you don’t agree with the general poli­tical line and want to express it publicly, you have to go to jail. The majo­rity however decides to leave the country. To ‘stay’ inside the country started to mean that you either fully embrace or just ‘accept’ the main poli­tical course (in a painful or hel­p­less way).


However, our goal at [Translit] was to cla­rify (or, at first, to find out) whe­ther it was indeed as dan­ge­rous to publish a journal with a clear anti-war mes­sage inside Russia as it seemed to us in the begin­ning. In the end, we could prove that it was still pos­sible. We decided not only to pro­duce a PDF and dis­tri­bute it in ‘safe-spaces’ of Wes­tern uni­ver­si­ties or on the web but to publish it on paper. Fur­ther­more, we dis­tri­buted it through our estab­lished net­works of inde­pen­dent books­tores so that the maga­zine and its con­tent would still exist in rus­sian books­tores and it will be used by rus­sian citizens.


Of course, we had to follow several safety pre­cau­tions: for example, delete the address of the printer’s firm and remove the list of all books­tores, where the journal could be purchased, from the cover. Yet, we hoped that it would yield a new infra­struc­ture of enun­cia­tion; or, at least, it would make the scep­tics think once again before they tried to make an argu­ment about what is pos­sible and impos­sible and about means of pro­test and resis­tance in today’s Russia in general.


N.G.: Ano­ther form of cri­ti­cism came from Galina Rymbu, also a well-known rus­sian-spea­king poet who has wit­nessed the begin­ning of the inva­sion in Lviv in Ukraine, where she con­ti­nues to live with her partner and child. On February 28, she just hap­pened to find access to the internet again after days wit­hout elec­tri­city because of the bom­bings and shel­ling, only to find her face­book news­feed drowned with anti-war poetry from fri­ends living in Russia or abroad. This act of soli­da­rity she described as enti­rely inap­pro­priate, now when dif­fe­rent forms of action are needed.


Her argu­ment can be summed up as fol­lows: On the one hand, those who hap­pened to expe­ri­ence real war, who have become vic­tims of rape and tor­ture, do not have the pos­si­bi­lity to write at all or do not have enough emo­tional distance to ‘poe­ti­cize’ this trau­matic expe­ri­ence. In the mean­time, others, who are still capable of wri­ting, use their lan­guage to draw atten­tion to their own trau­ma­tiza­tion from expe­ri­en­cing state tor­ture and their own hel­p­less­ness in front of it.


In your opi­nion, what should we con­sider when dra­wing our atten­tion to poetry written in times of war?


P.A.: What I find theo­re­ti­cally urgent here is the notion of the right to speak and to write (poe­ti­cally) from a spe­cific moment of time and from a spe­cific geo­gra­phical (and poli­tical) stand­point. The wide­spread and rapid emer­gence of cri­tics of ‘poe­ti­ci­zing from a distance’ hints at some­thing that has changed in the very rules of lite­rary beha­viour. These ‘ethical’ rules of com­mu­ni­ca­tion already existed before the War but are now re-intro­duced in a new manner. These rules pre­scribe a cer­tain atti­tude or ethics of speech bound to the posi­tion of the wit­ness and the idea of poetic lan­guage as ‘tes­timony’. Distance is being unders­tood here not only as a geo­gra­phical, phy­sical distance of the speaker from the events he or she is spea­king about but also in the sense of some moral right to speak about cer­tain events.


In other words, the time and place from which a spe­cific poetic enun­cia­tion is made have become more rele­vant than any other infor­ma­tion that is being car­ried inside the semantic mate­rial like, for example, meter, rhythm, or other formal aspects. This infor­ma­tion can be regarded now as some sort of ‘meta-tex­tual’ marks and is being judged accordingly.


As ano­ther of my col­le­agues, a poet from St. Peters­burg, Alek­sandr Skidan, has put it, spea­king poe­ti­cally right now started to be very risky. It means, that you both “should and you shouldn’t try” – “This lesson also tells you to keep still, so you don’t get hurt” («а еще урок говорит молчи / целее будешь»)[2]: The stakes both for spea­king and for remai­ning silent have become high right now, and it is a direct (literal) con­se­quence of a poli­tical cata­strophe that is also hap­pe­ning inside the lan­guage. Now we need to re-think the whole balance and the distinc­tion we have been making bet­ween “being voiceful” and “being silent” in a poli­tical sense in peaceful times.


N.G.: Galina Rymbu also pointed out that nearly all major media out­lets in the West initi­ally turned their atten­tion to russia and rus­sian artists to ask them “how they felt about the situa­tion”, ins­tead of asking the Ukrai­nian side. This is just a sym­ptom of a bigger imba­lance and eco­nomy of atten­tion that still exists in the post-soviet geo­gra­phical space. Hence, I have to ask you more directly why did [Translit] decide not to col­la­bo­rate with Ukrai­nian aut­hors and artists on this par­ti­cular issue. Was it a con­se­quence of failed negotiations?


P.A.: If it is at all a pro­duc­tive per­spec­tive for art coming from Russia to remain invi­sible or silent at least for a cer­tain amount of time, it is exactly out of under­stan­ding our own pri­vi­lege and the atten­tion that we have in the wes­tern media. Hence remai­ning ‘silent’ would not happen out of being afraid of ‘being repressed’ or out of being ‘can­celled’ but out of the wish to redis­tri­bute the exis­ting capital of atten­tion. Hop­efully, to make it better, [Translit] will still be able to dedi­cate a full issue to Ukrai­nian voices and poets from Ukraine in the future, or maybe to even let them make one in our place.


Yet in February 2022, the first glance into our common face­book thread did not make us feel that our Ukrai­nian col­le­agues might feel com­for­table about working tog­e­ther with us on this par­ti­cular issue. It made it even less appro­priate to ask for col­la­bo­ra­tion about ‘poetry’ at this moment. The reason why we still thought we had the right to speak and to publish (we started to prepare this publi­ca­tion in March) was merely to express that we were strictly against any ‘nor­ma­liza­tion’ of the situa­tion or main­tai­ning an illu­sion of it. Fur­ther­more, we sensed the neces­sity to deal with the inner demons of our cul­ture that has led to this unpre­ce­dented poli­tical and cul­tural catastrophe.


Only in a short period of time, just a few months, we felt as if all our pro­fes­sional branch in lite­rary and theo­re­tical wri­ting has become similar to those who are dis­co­ve­ring and ana­ly­zing a ‘dead’ lan­guage and a ‘dead’ cul­ture – like the clas­sics or lin­gu­i­stics of a dead lan­guage that no one is using anymore.


N.G.: What exactly creates this apo­ca­lyptic fee­ling of ‘fini­tude’, the fee­ling of its nea­ring end? Has this war become an ‘event’ hap­pe­ning inside the lan­guage and the cul­ture itself, and what makes it des­troy the lan­guage from within or make it inope­rable for users? Is it com­pa­rable with the effects that Ausch­witz had on poetic enun­cia­tion in general and for the German lan­guage espe­ci­ally (being more con­ta­mi­nated than others)?


P.A.: As a phi­lo­so­pher of lan­guage, I am asking myself: What does it mean to use the same lan­guage as a war cri­minal does, a lan­guage which is con­ta­mi­nated by some type of toxi­city? In my view, lan­guage should be con­sidered a kind of geo­lo­gical for­ma­tion that trans­ports supers­ti­tions, cul­tural reflexes, inclu­ding impe­ria­li­stic ambi­tions. It func­tions as a form of invi­sible cul­tural moto­rics. In the same way, I am now asking myself which forms of sedi­men­ta­tion of toxi­city have been accu­mu­lated inside the rus­sian lan­guage for decades.


I may refer here to a quote made by Nietz­sche to make an example:      “[…] we cannot get rid of God if we still believe in grammar” (“Ich fürchte, wir werden Gott nicht los, weil wir noch an die Gram­matik glauben“. Götzen-Däm­me­rung, Chapter 5). Maybe the grammar and other inner fea­tures of the rus­sian lan­guage as a system have been rein­for­cing cul­tural impe­ria­lism in the past, too. Already on the level of form and not simply ‘con­tent’. Using this lan­guage would then mean to ope­rate the same cul­tural reflexes.


Alt­hough I am strictly against assuming a ‘coll­ec­tive guilt’ con­cer­ning all the spea­kers of the lan­guage itself in this ins­tance – the situa­tion that we are facing today more gene­rally is, in fact, very similar to the German one. Lots of German poets and intellec­tuals have found their own per­sonal ans­wers to this ques­tion of how to con­tinue living and how to con­tinue wri­ting (poetry) after such a cata­strophe. Yet I would see our task in ack­now­led­ging a cer­tain (tra­gical) end, or maybe even sui­cide of the cul­ture (not only lan­guage) as a whole, in the first place.


N.G.: Yet it seems that the fee­ling of ‘sui­cide’ or ‘end’ of cul­ture is some­thing that only users from the ‘center’ are expe­ri­en­cing. I came across similar expres­sions in rus­sian social media, uttered by many dif­fe­rent wri­ters and cul­tural workers even with dif­fe­rent poli­tical back­grounds but who have been asso­cia­ting them­selves with the cul­tural centre, e.g. Dmitry Bykov[3], or the pro­ducer Olek­sandr Rod­n­yansky (among his renown pro­jects are, e.g. A. Zvyag­int­sevs films “Levia­than” and “Nelyubov”).[4] Would (and should), for example, a rus­sian spea­king writer who hap­pened to be born in Ukraine and is curr­ently living in Israel expe­ri­ence such a cata­strophe inside the lan­guage as well?


P.A.: I think it is an issue that should pro­bably con­cern all poets and wri­ters, who think and write in rus­sian. Many of the users of this lan­guage may not agree with this radical vision – as a rule, they are mostly those who have already invested way too much in this lan­guage to just ‘abandon’ or stop using it.


The ques­tion about ‘col­la­bo­ra­tio­nism’ with the rus­sian lan­guage remains unsolved for me per­so­nally, too. Right now, I am playing with the phrase in my head: “I would forget Rus­sian lan­guage only due to the fact that Putin has spoken it.“ («Я бы русский забыл только за то, что на нем разговаривал Путин»[5]) Nevert­heless, I am still hesi­ta­ting to put it into prac­tice, not because of some per­sonal and indi­vi­dual invest­ments that I have made myself into this lan­guage by wri­ting poetry, but rather con­side­ring theo­re­tical implications.


What has always been inte­res­ting to me are pos­sible sce­na­rios for working with con­ta­mi­nated lan­guage as such and explo­ring pos­si­bi­li­ties of extra­c­ting some­thing valuable from it. And seen from a his­to­rical per­spec­tive, moments of crisis of speech and utterance, pre­cisely in times of war, have always been mar­kers of the hig­hest point of poetic aspi­ra­tions, as they have been cele­brated by poets for being vehicles that trans­form language.


Our pri­mary con­cern, in the end, should not be the scep­ti­cism about “whe­ther we can speak” or “write poetry” after Bucha or the War in Ukraine in general. But we shall pre­cisely be con­cerned about not wri­ting in the same way as before. In other words, we should be very cri­tical about the way we use language.


N.G.: After the inva­sion of Ukraine the notion of ‘decay’ of rus­sian lan­guage has sud­denly become a trend in Slavic stu­dies almost enti­rely con­nected to the ongoing War. The article by Andrei Voi­tovskij about the so-called ‘des­in­te­gra­tion of rus­sian lan­guage’ which he linked to the war (‘pos­le­voennyj raspad yazyka’) appeared on the internet plat­form[6] in August, quo­ting several aut­hors who were published in [Translit]. Already in November, Natalia Fedo­rova[7] created an online course at the Smolny Beyond Bor­ders (online uni­ver­sity for rus­sian aca­demic rese­ar­chers in exile) where the “decay of lan­guage” is linked to the trends of the interwar poetic expe­ri­ments and the deve­lo­p­ment of con­crete poetry after WWII. Why is this link important?


P.A.: I see no con­tra­dic­tion bet­ween the con­sta­ta­tion of bank­ruptcy of means and modes of social com­mu­ni­ca­tion and the pro­cla­ma­tion of the need for poetic expe­ri­men­ta­tion with the new forms. Espe­ci­ally because the lan­guage of poli­tics or of civil affairs exposes its cor­rup­tion, poetry could inter­vene with it. It is also true that our issue, while con­sta­ting the obso­le­s­cence of former ways of expres­sion, draws on a rela­tively rich cul­tural tra­di­tion which has the idea of the des­truc­tion of tra­di­tion at its core. Poli­ti­cally sen­si­tive and expe­ri­mental poetry always faces some limits of exis­ting forms of expres­sion and con­demns them.


In fact, dif­fi­cul­ties with speech target pre­cisely the sphere where poetic inno­va­tion still can and should unfold. Hence, poetic inven­tion shall unfold on the same level where poli­tical repres­sion exists and should strike back in the very same dimen­sion and not just be an out­dated form of consolation.


N.G.: Aut­hors in the latest [Translit] issue pre­sent a broad range of approa­ches and modes of poetic spea­king. Some adopt an affec­tive and emo­tional per­spec­tive, while others pursue a purely ana­ly­tical approach, fol­lo­wing in the foot­s­teps of the Soviet under­ground tra­di­tion (like the Lia­no­zovo school, e.g.)


Yet, facing the ons­laught of the daily news, one cannot but wonder what aim or pur­pose jus­ti­fies the urge to write poetry now, and who exactly is its addressee? Espe­ci­ally the atti­tude of anti­ci­pa­ting the ‘end’ of rus­sian cul­ture is somehow con­tra­dic­tory to the strange ‘over­pro­duc­tion’ of speech, which is hap­pe­ning among the rus­sian spea­king exiled com­mu­ni­ties in the sphere of social media. As if all the spea­kers and car­riers of this lan­guage and cul­ture wanted to use its remai­ning energy to grasp the ongoing cata­strophe in words. But it only results in the cea­se­less dis­cus­sions about the apo­ca­lypse, and not in ‘silence’ that would accom­pany real mour­ning and grief. Does it mean that all these written poetic words are addressed to no one else than the rus­sian spea­king com­mu­nity itself, lea­ving no room for a dia­logue with those who are suf­fe­ring from the rus­sian mili­tary aggres­sion at the front lines?


P.A.: We find our­selves in the middle of a situa­tion where we cannot expect from poetry full appre­hen­sion of this cata­strophe. Ins­tead, we observe the ‘imme­diacy’ of the reac­tions to it and a range of dif­fe­rent forms of these reac­tions – it is a direct con­se­quence of our living in the digital era. We also shouldn’t unde­re­sti­mate the long-term effects that cen­sor­ship brings to the lan­guage, starting from the divi­sion bet­ween publicly allowed spea­king and the spea­king “out” on social media that causes a flood of euphe­misms in social interactions.


The effect of overa­bun­dance of the lan­guage, that you are poin­ting at, can be seen as a sym­pto­matic reac­tion towards the vio­lence that the state or the war cen­sor­ship per­forms towards it, because it also affects the ever­yday com­mu­ni­ca­tion, lan­guage as a social tool, the very chan­nels of basic human understanding.


We also tend to unde­re­sti­mate how far the infra­struc­ture of social media and the imme­diacy of news which are being thrown at us every day limit us in our poli­tical actions. The state of being ‘over­in­formed’ creates immo­bi­lity and a fee­ling of impos­si­bi­lity to with­stand the evil. Any type of reac­tion with speech, and espe­ci­ally with poetry in this state of mind is a pro­duc­tive way of get­ting out of this numb­ness, because it might help, after a while, to recover poli­tical acti­vity as well.


The more news and images we receive about what hap­pens, the more it is broa­de­ning our grief. Con­cen­t­ra­ting on our daily acti­vi­ties, like coll­ec­ting and sorting clo­thes for refu­gees e.g., on the other hand, helps sorting the mind, clea­ring it of unneces­sary stuff for a while. This is why we all are trying to engage in vol­un­teer work as much as pos­sible, inside and out­side of Russia – to still be able to per­ceive our­selves as actors, having agency and subjectivity.



[1] Cf. Kadan, Nikita: “No use for words that do not save lifes”, an open letter as an answer to Dmitry Vilensky (Chto Delat Group), in: Art­ter­ri­tory. Com (03.10.22) :

[2] Skidan, Alek­sandr (2022): выходят адорно и беньямин / прилавки подписных изданий ломятся от антифашистской литературы / а ты стоишь один на один / с уроком литературы // урок говорит отвечай / погасло дневное светило / и были лучезарны вечера / и автора поставили к стенке // а еще урок говорит молчи / целее будешь / и тонкая струйка мочи / течет из лицейской осени // и тебя обнимают одноклассники / сокамерники палачи.

[3] Bykov, Dmitrij: „Dym‑2. Podrazhanie Tur­ge­nevu“, in: (23.07.22): „То, что русская культура стала сегодня темой многочисленных дискуссий о перспективе ее отмены или запрета, лишь выявило ее глубокое внутреннее свойство — тесную связь с механизмом отмены и, если угодно, некоторую болезненную сосредоточенность, зацикленность на этой проблеме. Никто в мире еще не додумался ее глобально отменить — то есть по крайней мере запретить русскую классику, — но сама себя она уже отменяет вовсю.“ Cf.

[4] Rod­n­yanski, Olek­sandr: „Posle Buchi […]”, in: (04.04.22): “После Бучи нельзя больше говорить о российской культуре. Она не уберегла российского человека от варварства, от зверства и оскотинивания. Она виновна. Все к ней причастные виновны. Предстоит долгий путь перерождения. И покаяния. Просить прощения поздно. И не у кого. Их убили, изнасиловали и бросили в ямы в Буче, Ирпене, Гостомеле…, Cf.

[5] Andrei Orlov (2015): „А после Донбасса и наших в Крыму / Вопрос оголяю до сути: / Я русский забыл бы уже потому, /Что им разговаривал Путин”. Cf.

[6] Voi­tovski, Andrei : « Pos­le­voennyi raspad yazyka […]” (15.08.22)

[7] Cf. course descrip­tion at :

Image source: a col­lage of the anti-war images of the poli­tical move­ment “Vesna” (engl.: spring) from Saint Petersburg.